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Abstract
In this paper we propose to use elements of the mathematical for-
malism of Quantum Mechanics to capture the idea that agents’ pref-
erences, in addition to being typically uncertain, can also be indeter-
minate. They are determined (i.e., realized, and not merely revealed)
only when the action takes place. An agent is described by a state
that is a superposition of potential types (or preferences or behav-
iors). This superposed state is projected (or “collapses”) onto one
of the possible behaviors at the time of the interaction. In addition
to the main goal of modelling uncertainty of preferences that is not
due to lack of information, this formalism seems to be adequate to de-
scribe widely observed phenomena of noncommutativity in patterns of
behavior. We explore some implications of our approach in a compari-
son between classical and type indeterminate rational choice behavior.
The potential of the approach is illustrated in two examples.
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1 Introduction
It has recently been proposed that models of quantum games can be used to
study how the extension of classical moves to quantum ones (i.e., complex
linear combinations of classical moves) can affect the analysis of a game. For
example Eisert et al. (1999) show that allowing the players to use quantum
strategies in the Prisoners’ Dilemma is a way of escaping the well-known ‘bad
feature’ of this game.1 From a game-theoretical point of view the approach
consists in changing the strategy spaces, and thus the interest of the results
lies in the appeal of these changes.2
This paper also proposes to use elements of the mathematical formalism
of Quantum Mechanics but with a different intention: to model uncertain
preferences.3 The basic idea is that the Hilbert space model of Quantum
Mechanics can be thought of as a very general contextual predictive tool
particularly well-suited to describing experiments in psychology or in “re-
vealing” preferences.
The well-established Bayesian approach suggested by Harsanyi to model
incomplete information consists of a chance move that selects the types of
the players and informs each player of his own type. For the purposes of
this paper, we underline the following essential implication of this approach:
all uncertainty about a player’s type exclusively reflects the others player’s
incomplete knowledge of it. This follows from the fact that a Harsanyi type
is fully determined. It is a complete well-defined description of the charac-
teristics of a player that is known to him. Consequently, from the point of
view of the other players, uncertainty as to the type can only be due to lack
of information. Each player has a probability distribution over the type of
the other players, but her own type is fully determined and is known to her.
This brings us to the first important point at which we depart from the
classical approach: we propose that in addition to informational reasons, the
uncertainty about preferences is due to indeterminacy : prior to the moment a
1In the classical version of the dilemma, the dominant strategy for both players is to
defect and thereby to do worse than if they had both decided to cooperate. In the quantum
version, there are a couple of quantum strategies that are both a Nash equilibrium and
Pareto optimal and whose payoff is the one of the joint cooperation.
2This approach is closely related to quantum computing. It relies on the use of a
sophisticated apparatus to exploit q-bits’ property of entanglement in mixed strategies.
3In this work we borrow the elements of the quantum formalism that concern the
measurement process. We will not use the part of the theory theory concerned with the
evolution of systems over time.
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player acts, her (behavior) type is indeterminate. The state representing the
player is a superposition of potential types. It is only at the moment when the
player selects an action that a specific type is actualized.4 It is not merely re-
vealed but rather determined in the sense that prior to the choice, there is an
irreducible multiplicity of potential types. Thus we suggest that in modelling
a decision situation, we do not assume that the preference characteristics can
always be fully known with certainty (neither to the decision-maker nor even
to the analyst). Instead, what can be known is the state of the agent: a vec-
tor in a Hilbert space which encapsulates all existing information to predict
how the agent is expected to behave in different decision situations.
This idea, daringly imported from Quantum Mechanics to the context of
decision and game theory, is very much in line with Tversky and Simonson
(Kahneman and Tversky 2000) according to whom “There is a growing body
of evidence that supports an alternative conception according to which prefer-
ences are often constructed – not merely revealed – in the elicitation process.
These constructions are contingent on the framing of the problem, the method
of elicitation, and the context of the choice”. In Ariely, Prelec and Loewen-
stein (2003), the authors show in a series of experiments that ”valuations
are initially malleable but become ”imprinted” after the agent is called upon
to make an initial decision” (p. 74). This view is also consistent with that
of cognitive psychology, which teaches one to distinguish between objective
reality and the proximal stimulus to which the observer is exposed, and to
further distinguish between those and the mental representation of the situa-
tion that the observer eventually constructs. More generally, this view fits in
with the observation that players (even highly rational ones) may act differ-
ently in game theoretically equivalent situations that differ only in seemingly
irrelevant aspects (framing, prior unrelated events, etc.). Our theory as to
why agents act differently in game theoretically equivalent situations is that
they are not in the same state; (revealed) preferences are contextual because
of (intrinsic) indeterminacy.
The basic analogy with Physics, which makes it appealing to adopt the
mathematical formalism of Quantum Mechanics to the social sciences, is
the following: we view decisions and choices as something similar to the
result of a measurement (of the player’s type). A situation of decision is
then similar to an experimental setup to measure the player’s type. It is
4The associated concept of irreducible uncertainty, which is the essence of indetermi-
nacy, is formally defined in Section 2 of the paper.
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modelled by an operator (called observable), and the resulting behavior is an
eigenvalue of that operator. The non-commutativity of observables and its
consequences (very central features of Quantum Mechanics) is reminiscent of
many empirical phenomena like the following one exhibited in a well-known
experiment conducted by Leon Festinger.5 In this experiment people were
asked to sort a batch of spools into lots of twelve and give a square pegs a
quarter turn to the left. They all agreed that the task was very boring. Then,
they were told that one subject was missing for the experiment and asked to
convince a potential female subject in the waiting room to participate. They
were offered $1 for expressing their enthusiasm for the task.6 Some refused,
but others accepted. Those who accepted maintained afterwards that the
task was enjoyable. This experiment aimed at showing that attitudes change
in response to cognitive dissonance. The dissonance faced by those who
accepted to fake enthusiasm for $1 was due to the contradiction between
the self-image of being ”a good guy” and that of ”being ready to lie for a
dollar”. Changing one’s attitude and persuading oneself that the task really
was interesting was a way to resolve the dissonance. Similar phenomena have
been documented in hazardous industries, with employees showing very little
caution in the face of a danger. Here too, experimental and empirical studies
(e.g., Daniel Ben–Horing 1979) showed how employees change their attitude
after they have decided to work in a hazardous industry. More generally,
suppose that an agent is presented with the same situation of decision in two
different contexts. The contexts may vary with respect to the situation of
decision that precedes the investigated one. In Festinger’s experiment the
two measurements of the attitude toward the task differ in that the second
one was preceded by a question about willingness to lie about the task for
a dollar. Two contexts may also vary with respect to the framing of the
situation of decision, (cf. Selten 1998)). If we do not observe the same
decision in the two contexts, then the classical approach considers that the
two situations are not identical and hence that they should be modeled so
as to incorporate the context. In many cases, however, such an assumption,
i.e., that the situations are different, is difficult to justify.
In contrast, we propose that the difference between the two decisions
comes from the fact that the agent is not in the same state. The context,
5Leon Festinger is the father of the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957).
6The experience was richer. People were divided into two groups offered different
amounts of money. For our purpose it is sufficient to focus on a single result.
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e.g., a past situation of decision to which the agent has been exposed, is rep-
resented by an operator that does not commute with the operator associated
with the situation of decision currently considered. The consequence is that
the initial agent’s state has changed and that the agent is therefore expected
to behave differently from what she would have done if confronted directly
with the situation. As in Quantum Mechanics, the non-commutativity of
certain situations of decision (measurements) leads us to conjecture that the
preferences of an agent are represented by a state that is indeterminate and
gets determined (with respect to any particular type characteristics) in the
course of interaction with the environment. In section 3, we show how this
approach can explain the reversal of preferences in a model of rational choice
and that it provides a framework for explaining cognitive dissonance and
framing effects.
The objective of this paper is to propose a theoretical framework for
modelling the KT(Kahneman–Tversky)–man, i.e., for the ”constructive pref-
erence perspective”. Our approach amounts to extending the classical rep-
resentation of uncertainty in Harsanyi’s style to non-classical indeterminacy.
This work is a contribution to Behavioral Economics. A distinguishing feature
of behavioral theories is that they often focus on rather specific anomalies
(e.g., ‘trade-off contrast’ or ‘extremeness aversion’ (Kahneman and Tversky
2000). Important insights have been obtained by systematically investigating
the consequences on utility maximization of ‘fairness concerns’ (Rabin 1993),
‘temptation and costly self-control’ (Gul and Pesendorfer 2001) or ‘concerns
for self-image’ (Benabou and Tirole 2002). Yet, other explanations appeal to
bounded rationality, e.g., ‘superficial reasoning’ or ‘choice of beliefs’ (Selten
1998, Akerlof and Dickens 1982). In contrast, the type indeterminacy model
is a framework model that addresses structural properties of preferences,
i.e., their intrinsic indeterminacy. A value of our approach is in providing a
unified explanation for a wide variety of behavioral phenomena.
In section 2, we present the framework and some basic notions of quantum
theory. In Section 3, we develop applications of the theory to social sciences.
In Section 4, we discuss some basic assumptions of the model. The appendix
provides a brief exposition of some basic concepts of Quantum Mechanics.
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2 The basic framework
In this section we present the basic notions of our framework. They are
heavily inspired by the mathematical formalism of Quantum Mechanics ( see
e.g., Cohen-Tannoudji, Diu, Laloe¨ 1973 and Cohen 1989) from which we also
borrow the notation.
2.1 The notions of state and superposition
The object of our investigation is the individual choice behavior, which we
interpret as the revelation of an agent’s preferences in a situation of decision
that we shall call a DS (Decision Situation). In this paper, we focus on
decision situations that do not involve any strategic thinking. Examples of
such DS include the choice between buying a Toshiba or a Compaq laptop,
the choice between investing in a project or not, the choice between a sure
gain of $100 or a bet with probability 0.5 to win $250 and 0.5 to win $0,
etc. When considering games, we view them as decision situations from the
perspective of a single player who plays once.7
An agent is represented by a state which encapsulates all the information
on the agent’s expected choice behavior. The formalism that we present
below allows for a variety of underlying models. In particular, some states
may correspond to a choice. For instance if the choice set is {a, b, c} , we may
identify three possible states corresponding to the respective choices a, b and
c. A state may also correspond to an ordering of the 3 items in which case
we have six possible states (e.g. a state could be (a,b,c) in this order). We
may also consider other models. In section 3.1 we examine consequences of
the second case. For the ease of exposition, the basic framework is presented
in terms of the first case where states are identified with choices (but the
reader is invited to keep in mind that other interpretations of the model are
possible). However what we just wrote must be considered in the light of the
principle of superposition as explained below.
Mathematically, a state |ψ〉 is a vector in a Hilbert space H of finite or
countably infinite dimensions, over the field of the real numbers R.8 The
7All information (beliefs) and strategic considerations are embedded in the definition
of the choices. Thus an agent’s play of cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, is a play of
cooperation given his information (knowledge) about the opponent.
8In Quantum Mechanics the field that is used is the complex numbers field. However,
for our purposes the field of real numbers provides the structure and the properties needed
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relationship between H and a decision situation will be specified later. For
technical reasons related to the probabilistic content of the state, each state
vector has to be of length one, that is, 〈ψ |ψ〉2 = 1 (where 〈· |·〉 denotes the
inner product inH). So all vectors of the form λ |ψ〉 where λ ∈ R, correspond
to the same state, which we represent by a vector of length one.
A key ingredient in the formalism of indeterminacy is the principle of
superposition. This principle states that the linear combination of any two
states is itself a possible state.9 Consider two states |ϕ1〉 , |ϕ2〉 ∈ H. If
|ψ〉 = λ1 |ϕ1〉 + λ2 |ϕ2〉 with λ1, λ2 ∈ R then |ψ〉 ∈ H. The principle of
superposition implies that, unlike the Harsanyi type space, the state space is
non-Boolean.10
2.2 The notions of measurement and of observable
Measurement is a central notion in our framework. A measurement is an
operation (or an experiment) performed on a system. It yields a result, the
outcome of the measurement. A defining feature of a measurement is the
so-called first-kindness property.11 It refers to the fact that if one performs
a measurement on a system and obtains a result, then one will get the same
result if one performs again that measurement on the same system immedi-
ately after. Thus, the outcome of a first-kind measurement is reproducible
but only in a next subsequent measurement. First-kindness does not entail
that the first outcome is obtained when repeating a measurement if other
measurements are performed on the system in between. Whether an opera-
tion is a measurement, i.e., is endowed with the property of first-kindness is
an empirical issue. When it comes to decision theory, it means that we do
not, a priory, assume that any choice set can be used to measure preferences.
(see e.g. Beltrametti and Cassinelli 1981 and Holland 1995). Everything we present in
the appendix (Elements of quantum mechanics) remains true when we replace Hermitian
operators with real symmetric operators.
9We use the term state to refer to ‘pure state’. Some people use the term state to refer
to mixture of pure states. A mixture of pure states combines indeterminacy with elements
of incomplete information. They are represented by the so called density operators.
10The distributivity condition defining a Boolean space is dropped for a weaker condition
called ortho-modularity. The basic structure of the state space is that of a logic, i.e., an
orthomodular lattice. For a good presentation of Quantum Logic, a concept introduced
by Birkhoff and Von Neuman (1936), and further developed by Mackey (2004, 1963), see
Cohen (1989).
11The term first-kind measurement was introduced by Pauli.
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In particular, the product set of two sets each of which is associated with a
first-kind measurement, is not in general associated with a first-kind mea-
surement. The set of decision problems that we consider consists exclusively
of decision problems that can be associated with first-kind measurements.
We call those decision problems Decision Situations (DS ).12
A Decision Situation A can be thought of as an experimental setup where
the agent is invited to choose a particular action among all the possible
actions allowed by this Decision Situation. In this paper, we will consider
only the case of finitely many possible outcomes. They will be labelled from
1 to n by convention. When an agent selects an action, we say that she
‘plays’ the DS. To every Decision Situation A, we will associate an observable,
namely, a specific symmetric operator on H which, for notational simplicity,
we also denote by A.13 If we consider only one Decision Situation A with
n possible outcomes, we can assume that the associated Hilbert space is
n-dimensional and that the eigenvectors of the corresponding observable,
which we denote by |1A〉, |2A〉, ..., |nA〉, all correspond to different eigenvalues,
denoted by 1A, 2A, ..., nA respectively. By convention, the eigenvalue iA will
be associated with choice i.
A |kA〉 = kA |kA〉 , k = 1, ..., n.
As A is symmetric, there is a unique orthonormal basis of the relevant
Hilbert space H formed with its eigenvectors. The basis {|1A〉, |2A〉, ..., |nA〉}
is the unique orthonormal basis of H consisting of eigenvectors of A. It is
thus possible to represent the agent’s state as a superposition of vectors of
this basis:
|ψ〉 =
n∑
k=1
λk |kA〉 , (1)
where λk ∈ R, ∀k ∈ {1, ..., n} and
n∑
k=1
λ2k = 1.
12Even standard decision theory implicitely restricts its application to decision problems
satisfying the first-kindness property (or that can be derived from such decision problems).
In contrast, random utility models do not require choice behavior to satisfy the first-
kindness property in the formulation used in this paper.
13Observables in Physics are represented by Hermetian operators because QM is defined
over the field of complex numbers. Here, we confine ourselves to the field of real numbers
which is why observables are represented by symmetric operators.
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The Hilbert space can be decomposed as follows
H = H1A⊕, ...,⊕HnA , HiA ⊥ HjA, i 6= j, (2)
where ⊕ denotes the direct sum of the subspaces H1A , ...,HnA spanned by
|1A〉, ..., |nA〉 respectively.14 Or, equivalently, we can write IH = P1A+, ...,+PnA
where PiA is the projection operator on HiA and IH is the identity operator
on H.
A Decision Situation A is an experimental setup and the actual implemen-
tation of the experiment is represented by a measurement of the associated
observable A. According to the so-called Reduction Principle (see Appendix),
the result of such a measurement can only be one of the n eigenvalues of A. If
the result is mA, i.e., the player selects action m, the superposition
∑
λi |iA〉
“collapses” onto the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue mA. The ini-
tial state |ψ〉 is projected into the subspace HmA(of eigenvectors of A with
eigenvalue mA). The probability that the measurement yields the result mA
is equal to 〈mA |ψ〉2 = λ2m, i.e., the square of the corresponding coefficient
in the superposition. The coefficients themselves are called ‘amplitudes of
probability’. They play a key role when studying sequences of measurements
(see Section 2.3). As usual, we interpret the probability of mA either as the
probability that one agent in state |ψ〉 selects action mA or as the proportion
of the agents who will make the choice mA in a population of many agents,
all in the state |ψ〉.
In our theory an agent is represented by a state. We shall also use the term
type (and eigentype) to denote a state corresponding to one eigenvector, say
|mA〉 . An agent in this state is said to be of type mA. An agent in a general
state |ψ〉 can be expressed as a superposition of all eigentypes of the DS under
consideration. Our notion of type is closely related to the notion introduced
by Harsanyi. Consider a simple choice situation e.g., when an employee faces
a menu of contracts. The type captures all the agent’s characteristics (taste,
subjective beliefs, private information) of relevance for uniquely predicting
the agent’s behavior. In contrast to Harsanyi, we shall not assume that there
exists an exhaustive description of the agent that enables us to determine the
agent’s choice uniquely and simultaneously in all possible Decision Situations
14That is, for i 6= j any vector in HiA is orthogonal to any vector in HjA and any vector
in H is a sum of n vectors, one in each component space.
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. Instead, our types are characterized by an irreducible uncertainty that is
revealed when the agent is confronted with a sequence of DS (see Section
2.3.2 below for a formal characterization of irreducible uncertainty).
Remark: Clearly, when only one DS is considered, the above description
is equivalent to the traditional probabilistic representation of an agent by a
probability vector (α1,....,αn) in which αk is the probability that the agent will
choose action kA and αk = λ
2
k for k = 1, ..., n. The advantage of the proposed
formalism consists in enabling us to study several decision situations and the
interaction between them.
2.3 More than one Decision Situation
When studying more than one DS, say A and B, the key question is whether
the corresponding observables are commuting operators in H, i.e., whether
AB = BA.Whether two DS can be represented by two commuting operators
or not is an empirical issue. We next study its mathematical implications.
2.3.1 Commuting Decision Situations
Let A and B be two DS. If the corresponding observables commute then
there is an orthonormal basis of the relevant Hilbert space H formed by
eigenvectors common to both A and B. Denote by |i〉 (for i = 1, ..., n) these
basis vectors. We have
A |i〉 = iA |i〉 and B |i〉 = iB |i〉 .
In general, the eigenvalues can be degenerated (i.e., for some i and j, iA = jA
or iB = jB).
15 Any normalized vector |ψ〉 of H can be written in this basis:
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
λi |i〉 ,
where λi ∈ R, and
∑
i λ
2
i = 1. If we measure A first, we observe eigenvalue
iA with probability
pA (iA) =
∑
j;jA=iA
λ2j . (3)
15In the argument that we develop in section 3.1, the pure states are linear orders
therefore choice experiments are observables with degenerated eigenvalues
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If we measure B first, we observe eigenvalue jB with probability pB (jB) =∑
k;kB=jB
λ2k. After B is measured and the result jB is obtained, the state
|ψ〉 is projected into the eigensubspace EjB spanned by the eigenvectors of B
associated with jB. More specifically, it collapses onto the state:∣∣ψjB〉 = 1√∑
k;kB=jB
λ2k
∑
k;kB=jB
λk |k〉
(the factor 1qP
k;kB=jB
λ2k
is necessary to make
∣∣ψjB〉 a unit vector).
When we measure A on the agent in the state
∣∣ψjB〉 , we obtain iA with
probability
pA (iA|jB) = 1∑
k;kB=jB
λ2k
∑
k;kB=jB
and kA=iA
λ2k.
So when we measure first B and then A, the probability of observing the
eigenvalue iA is pAB (iA) =
∑
j pB (jB) pA (iA|jB):
pAB (iA) =
∑
j
1P
k;kB=jB
|λk|
2
∑
k;kB=jB
λ2k
∑
l;lB=jB
and lA=iA
λ2l
=
∑
j
∑
l;lB=jB
and lA=iA
λ2l =
∑
l;lA=jA
λ2l .
Hence, pAB (iA) = pA (iA) , ∀i, and similarly pBA (jB) = pB (jB) , ∀j.
When dealing with commuting observables it is meaningful to speak of
measuring them simultaneously. Whether we measure first A and then B
or first B and then A, the probability distribution on the joint outcome is
p (iA ∧ jB) =
∑
k;kB=jB
and kA=iA
λ2k, so (iA , jB) is a well-defined event. Formally,
this implies that the two DS can be merged into a single DS. When we
measure it, we obtain a vector as the outcome, i.e., a value in A and a value
in B. To each eigenvalue of the merged observable we associate a type that
captures all the characteristics of the agent relevant to her choices (one in
each DS ).
Remark: Note that, as in the case of a single DS, for two such commuting
DS our model is equivalent to a standard (discrete) probability space in
which the elementary events are {(iA, jB)} and p (iA ∧ jB) =
∑
k;kB=jB
and kA=iA
λ2k.
In particular, in accordance with the calculus of probability we see that the
conditional probability formula holds:
pAB(iA ∧ jB) = pA(iA) pB(jB|iA).
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This also means that the type space associated with type characteristics
represented by commuting observables is equivalent to the Harsanyi type
space. In particular, if the Decision Situations A and B together provide a
full characterization of the agent, then all types iAjB are mutually exclusive:
knowing that the agent is of type 1A2B it is sure that she is not of type iAjB
for i 6= 1 and/or j 6= 2.
As an example, consider the following two Decision Situations. Let A be
the Decision Situation presenting a choice between a week vacation in Tunisia
and a week vacation in Italy. And let B be the choice between buying 1000
euros of shares of Bouygues Telecom or of Deutsche Telecom. It is quite
plausible that A and B commute, but whether or not this is the case is of
course an empirical question. If A and B commute, we expect that a decision
on portfolio (B) will not affect the decision-making concerning the vacation
(A). And thus the order in which the decisions are made does not matter as
in the classical model.
Note finally that the commutativity of the observables does not exclude
statistical correlations between observations. To see this, consider the fol-
lowing example in which A and B each have two degenerated eigenvalues in
a four dimensional Hilbert space. Denote by |iAjB〉 (i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2) the
eigenvector associated with eigenvalues iA of A and jB of B, and let the state
|ψ〉 be given by
|ψ〉 =
√
3
8
|1A1B〉+
√
1
8
|1A2B〉+
√
1
8
|2A1B〉+
√
3
8
|2A2B〉
Then, pA (1A|1B) =
3
8
3
8
+ 1
8
= 3
4
, pA (2A|1B) =
1
8
3
8
+ 1
8
= 1
4
.
So if we first measure B and find, say, 1B, it is much more likely (with
probability 3
4
) that when measuring A we will find 1A rather than 2A (with
probability 1
4
). But the two interactions (measurements) do not affect each
other, i.e., the distribution of the outcomes of the measurement of A is the
same whether or not we measure B first.
2.3.2 Non-commuting Decision Situations
It is when we consider Decision Situations associated with observables that
do not commute that the predictions of our model differ from those of
the probabilistic one. In such a context, the quantum probability calcu-
lus (p(iA |ψ ) = 〈iA |ψ〉2) generates cross-terms also called interference terms.
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These cross-terms are the signature of indeterminacy. In the next section,
we demonstrate how this feature can capture the phenomenon of cognitive
dissonance as well as that of framing.
Consider two Decision Situations A and B with the same number n of
possible choices. We shall assume for simplicity that the corresponding
observables A and B have non-degenerated eigenvalues 1A, 2A, ..., nA and
1B, 2B, ..., nB respectively. Each set of eigenvectors {|1A〉, |2A〉, ..., |nA〉} and
{|1B〉, |2B〉, ..., |nB〉} is an orthonormal basis of the relevant Hilbert space.
Let |ψ〉 be the initial state of the agent
|ψ〉 =
n∑
i=1
λi|iA〉 =
n∑
j=1
νj |jB〉 . (4)
We note that each set of eigenvectors of the respective observables forms
a basis of the state space. The multiplicity of alternative basis is a dis-
tinguishing feature of this formalism. It implies that there is no single or
privileged way to describe (express) the type of the agent. Instead, there
exists a multiplicity of equally informative alternative ways to characterize
the agent.
We shall now compute the probability for type iA under two different sce-
narios. In the first scenario we measure A on the agent in state |ψ〉 . In the
second scenario we first measure B on the agent in state |ψ〉 and thereafter
measure A on the agent in the state resulting from the first measurement.
We can write observable B′s eigenvector |jB〉 in the basis made of A′s eigen-
vectors:
|jB〉 =
n∑
i=1
µij |iA〉. (5)
Using the expression above we write the last term in equation (4)
|ψ〉 =
n∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
νjµij |iA〉. (6)
From expression (6), we derive the probability pA(iA) that the agent chooses
iA in the first scenario: pA(iA) =
(
n∑
j=1
νjµij
)2
. In the second scenario,
she first plays B. By (4) we see that she selects action jB with probability
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ν2j . The state |ψ〉 is then projected onto |jB〉. When the state is |jB〉, the
probability for iA is given by (5), it is µ
2
ij. Summing up the conditionals,
we obtain the (ex-ante) probability for iA when the agent first plays B and
then A : pAB(iA) =
n∑
j=1
ν2jµ
2
ij, which is, in general, different from pA(iA) =(
n∑
j=1
νjµij
)2
. Playing first B changes the way A is played. The difference
stems from the so-called interference terms
pA(iA) =
(
n∑
j=1
νjµij
)2
=
n∑
j=1
ν2jµ
2
ij + 2
∑
j 6=j′
[(
νj′µij
) (
νjµij′
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interference term
= pAB(iA) + interference term
The interference term is the sum of cross-terms involving the amplitudes of
probability (the Appendix provides a description of interference effects in
Physics).
Some intuition about interference effects may be provided using the con-
cept of ”propensity” due to Popper (1992). Imagine an agent’s mind as a
system of propensities to act (corresponding to different possible actions).
As long as the agent is not required to choose an action in a given DS, the
corresponding propensities coexist in her mind; the agent has not “made up
her mind”. A decision situation operates on this state of ”hesitation” to
trigger the emergence of a single type (of behavior). But as long as alterna-
tive propensities are present in the agent’s mind, they affect choice behavior
by increasing or decreasing the probability of the choices in the DS under
investigation.
An illustration of this kind of situation may be supplied by the experiment
reported in Knetz and Camerer (2000). The two studied DS are the Weak
Link (WL) game and the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game.16 They compare
the distribution of choices in the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game when it
16The Weak Link game is a type of coordination game where each player picks an action
from a set of integers. The payoffs are defined in such a manner that each player wants to
select the minimum of the other players but everyone wants that minimum to be as high
as possible.
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is preceded by a Weak Link (WL) game and when only the PD game is
being played. Their results show that playing the WL game affects the play
of individuals in the PD game. The authors appeal to an informational
argument, which they call the “precedent effect”.17 However, they cannot
explain the high rate of cooperation (37.5 %) in the last round of the PD
game (Table 5, p. 206). Instead, we propose that the WL and the PD are
two DS that do not commute. In such a case we expect a difference in the
distributions of choices in the (last round of the) PD depending on whether
or not it was preceded by a play of the WL or another PD game. This is
because the type of the agent is being modified by the play of the WL game.
Remark: In the case where A and B do not commute, they cannot have
simultaneously defined values: the state of the agent is characterized by an
irreducible uncertainty. Therefore, and in contrast with the commuting case,
two non-commuting observables cannot be merged into one single observable.
There is no probability distribution on the events of the type ”to have the
value iA for A and the value jB for B”. The conditional probability formula
does not hold:
pA(iA) 6=
n∑
j=1
pB(jB) p(iA|jB).
Indeed,
(
n∑
j=1
νjµij
)2
= pA(iA) 6=
n∑
j=1
pB(jB) p(iA|jB) =
n∑
j=1
ν2jµ
2
ij .
Consequently, the choice experiment consisting of asking the agent to
select a pair (iA, jB) out the set of alternatives A× B is NOT a DS.
We must here acknowledge a fundamental distinction between the type
space of our TI-model (Type Indeterminacy model) and that of Harsanyi. In
the Harsanyi type space the (pure) types are all mutually exclusive: the agent
is either of type θi or of type θj but she cannot be both! In the TI-model this
is not always the case. When dealing with (complete) non-commuting DS 18,
the types associated with respective DS are not mutually exclusive: knowing
17The precedent effect hypothesis is as follows: “The shared experience of playing the
efficient equilibrium in the WL game creates a precedent of efficient play strong enough to
(...) lead to cooperation in a finitely repeated PD game”, Knetz and Camerer (2000 see
p.206).
18We say that a DS is complete when its outcome provides a complete characterization
of the agent.
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that the agent is of type 1A, which is a full description of her type, it cannot
be said that she is not of type 1B. The eigentypes of non-commuting DS are
“connected” in the sense that the agent can transit from one type to another
under the impact of a measurement. When making a measurement of B on
the agent of type 1A, she is projected onto one of the eigenvectors of DS B.
Her type changes from being 1A to being some jB.
3 The Type Indeterminacy model and Social
Sciences
The theory of choice exposed in this paper does not allow for a straightfor-
ward comparison with standard choice theory. Significant further elaboration
is required. Yet, some implications of the type indeterminacy approach can
be explored. First, we shall be interested in comparing the behavior of an
agent of indeterminate type with the one of a classical agent in the case where
both satisfy the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP)19 which is a
basic axiom of rational choice. Then, we will show that this framework can
be used to explain two instances of behavioral anomalies that have been
extensively studied in the literature.
3.1 The TI-model and the classical rational man
In standard decision theory, it is assumed that an individual has preferences
(i.e. a complete ranking or a complete linear ordering) on the universal set of
alternatives X. The individual knows her preferences while the outsiders may
not know them. But it is also possible that the individual only knows what
she would choose from some limited sets of alternatives and not from the
whole set X . Thus, a less demanding point of view consists in representing
the choice behavior by a choice structure (i.e. a family B of subsets of the
universal set of alternatives X and a choice rule C that assigns a non empty
set of chosen elements C(A) for all A ∈ B). The link between the two points
of view is well-known. From preferences, it is always possible to build a
choice structure but the reverse is not always true. For it to be true, the
choice structure must display a certain amount of consistency (satisfying
the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference) and the family B must include all
19Samuelson (1947)
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subsets of X of up to three elements20. So, preferences can be revealed by
asking the individual to make several choices from subsets of X. How does
this simple scheme changes when we are dealing with an individual whose
type is indeterminate?
Consider a situation where an individual is invited to make a choice of
one item out of a set A, A ⊆ X. If this experiment satisfies the first-kindness
property, we can consider it to be a measurement represented by an observ-
able. The set of possible outcomes of this experiment is the set A. We also
denote the observable by A.21
We make two key assumptions on the individual choice behavior:
A1. Choices out of a “small” subset satisfy the first-kindness property
(the meaning of ”small” will be made precise).
A2. Choices out of a “small” subset respect our Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference (WARP’, see below).
Assumption A1 means that ”small” subsets are associated with DS, i.e.,
the experiment consisting in letting an individual choose an item out of a
”small” subset of item is a measurement. Assumption A2 means that choices
from “small” subsets are rational. The idea behind these assumptions is that
an individual can, in her mind, structure any ”small” set of alternatives, i.e.,
simultaneously compare those alternatives. She may not be able to do that
within a “big” set though. But this does not mean that our individual cannot
make a choice from a “big” set. For example, she might use an appropriate
sequence of binary comparisons and select the last winning alternative. How-
ever, such a compound operator would not in general satisfy the first-kindness
property i.e., there may not exist any DS representing such an operation.
A standard formulation of the WARP can be found in Mas-Colell et al.
(1995).22 We shall use a stronger version by assuming that C (B) , for any
B ∈ B, is a singleton.23 For our purpose, it is also useful to formulate the
axiom in two parts:
20See for example Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, Microeconomic Theory, p.13.
21The use of the same symbol for sets of items and observables should not confuse the
reader. Either the context unambiguously points to the right interpretation or we make
it precise.
22”If for some B ∈ B with x, y ∈ B we have x ∈ C (B) , then for any B′ ∈ B with x, y ∈
B′ and y ∈ C (B′) , we must also have x ∈ C (B′) .”(Mas-Colell et al. (1995) p.10).
23At this stage of the research we do not want to deal with indifference relations.
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Consider two subsets B, B′ ∈ B such that B ⊂ B′.
(a) Let x, y ∈ B, x 6= y with x ∈ C (B) then y /∈ C (B′) .
(b) Let C (B′) ∩ B 6= ∅ then C (B) = C (B′) .
The intuition for (a) is that as we enlarge the set of items from B to B′
a rational decision-maker never chooses from B′ an item that is available in
B but is not chosen. The intuition for (b) is that as we reduce the set of
alternatives an item chosen in the large set, is also chosen in the smaller set
containing that item and no item previously not chosen becomes chosen.24
It can be shown that in the classical context (b) implies (a) (see Arrow
(1959)). In our context where choice experiments can be non-commuting,
we do not have such an implication. Moreover, the notion of choice function
is not appropriate because it implicitly assumes the commutativity of choice
(see below). Since our purpose is to investigate this issue explicitly, we express
the axiom more immediately in terms of (observable) choice behavior in the
following way and we call it WARP’:
Consider two subsets B, B′ ∈ B with B ⊂ B′.
1) Suppose the agent chooses from B some element x. In a next subse-
quent measurement of B′ the outcome of the choice is not in B \ {x}.
2) Suppose the agent chooses from B′ some element x that belongs to B.
In a next subsequent measurement of B the agent’s choice is x.
Points (1) and (2) capture the classical intuitions about rational choice
behavior associated with (a) and (b) above. A distinction with the stan-
dard formulations of WARP is that we do not refer to a choice function
but to choice behavior and that our axiom only applies to two subsequent
choices. We shall see below that in the classical context where choices com-
mute WARP’ is equivalent to WARP. That is not longer true if we allow for
some choices not to commute.
We now investigate the choice behavior of a type indeterminate agent
under assumptions A1 and A2 above i.e., under the assumption that choices
from small subsets satisfy the property of first-kindness and that they respect
WARP’. We consider in turn two cases. In the first one, we assume that all
the DS considered pairwise commute. In the second one, we allow for non-
commuting DS. In the following we define “small” subsets as subsets of size
3 or less.
24Conditions (a) and (b) are equivalent to C2 and C4 in Arrow (1959).
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Case 1
The assumption here is that all experiments of choice from small subsets
are compatible with each other, i.e., the corresponding observables commute.
A first implication of the commutativity of choice experiments is that for
any B ⊆ X, the outcome of the choice experiment B only depends on B
(whatever was done before the choice in B will always be the same and in
particular the outcome does not depend on choices experiments that were
performed before). Therefore, we can express the outcome in terms of a
choice function C (X) : B → x that associates to each B ∈ B a chosen
item x ∈ B. A second consequence of commutativity is that the restriction
of WARP’ to two subsequent choices is inconsequential. This is because the
outcome of any given choice experiment must be the same in any series of
two consecutive experiments. In particular, WARP’ implies the transitivity
of choices. This can easily be seen we taking an example on a subset of 3 items
and performing choice experiments on pairs in different orders.25. So for the
case choice experiments commute, WARP’ is equivalent to WARP and we
recover the standard results. We know that if (B, C (.)) is a choice structure
satisfying WARP’ and defined for B including all subsets of X of up to three
elements, then there exists a rational preference relation that rationalizes
choice behavior.26 It is therefore natural to identify the states (types) of the
individual with the preference orders that rank all the elements of X. The
type space H has dimension |X|!.We obtain the well-known classical model.
In this model all DS are coarse measurements of the type (the pref-
erence order) i.e., their outcomes are degenerated eigenvalues (see Section
2.3.1). When all DS commute and satisfy WARP’, the type indeterminate
rational agent behaves in all respects as a classical rational agent. This
should not surprise us since we know that when observables commute they
25Consider the choice set {a, b, c} . We do the following two series of experiments. In the
first series we let the agent choose from {a, b}, then from {b, c} and last from {a, b, c} .In
the second series the agent first choose from {b, c} then from {a, b} and last from {a, b, c}.
Assume the outcomes of the two first experiments are a and b then by WRAP’ the
third choice maybe either a, or b. In the second series, the outcomes must be (because
of commutativity) b and a respectively. So the third choice may be either a or c. By
commutativity the outcome of {a, b, c} must be the same in the two series which uniquelly
selects a so a choice behavior respecting WRAP’ is transitive when the choices commute.
26See e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995) p.13.
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can be merged into a single observable and the TI-model is equivalent to the
classical model.
Case 2
We now consider a case where some DS do not commute. We need
to emphasize that, in contrast with the commuting case, a large amount
of non-commuting models are possible. The models differ from each other
according to which DS commute and which do not. We investigate here a
simple example that illustrates interesting issues.
Assume the set X consists of four items: a, b, c and d. As before, any
subset A ⊂ X consisting of 3 elements or less is associated with a DS and
we assume that any two consecutive choices made from small subsets respect
WARP’. Our non-commuting model is defined by the following assumption:
(nc) Choices out of A and B commute if and only if A ∪B 6= X.
In particular DS associated with different triples e.g., a choice out of
{a, b, c} and a choice out of {b, c, d} are represented by observables that do
not commute with each other. So for instance the agent may choose a out
of {a, b, c} , b out of {b, c, d} and thereafter c out of {a, c} . This may hap-
pened because the order (partially) revealed by the choice in {a, b, c} has
been modified by the performance of the {b, c, d} choice experiment. This
choice behavior satisfies WARP’ but violates transitivity. Nevertheless, the
satisfaction of WARP’ induces a certain amount of consistency in behavior.
In particular, any observable A with A ⊂ B where B is a triple, commutes
with B (since A ∪ B ⊂ X). We may perform choice experiments in pairs
and in triples so as to elicit a preference relation on each triple taken sepa-
rately. It is therefore natural to identify the types with preferences orders on
triples. Since observables representing choice experiments on different triples
do not commute with each other, they are alternative ways to measure the
individual’s preferences. The type space representing the individual is a six
dimensional Hilbert space because there are six ways to rank three items.
There are four alternative bases spanned by the eigenvectors corresponding
to the six possible rankings in each one of the four triples.
In this model the agent only has preferences over triples of items. One may
wonder what happens when she must make a choice out of the set {a, b, c, d} .
Many scenarios are possible. Suppose that the individual proceeds by making
a series of two measurements. For instance, she first selects from a pair
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followed by a choice from a triple consisting of the first selected item and
the two remaining ones. We can call such a behavior ”procedural rational”
because she acts as if she had preferences over the four items.
As an example consider the following line of events and for the ease of
presentation we let the DS associated with the set {a, b, c} be denoted abc
and similarly for the other DS . Suppose the individual just made a choice
in {a, b, c} and picked up c. So her initial state is some superposition of type
[c > b > a] and type [c > a > b]. We now ask her to choose from {a, b, c, d} .
Assume the individual first plays ab then bcd (which by assumption of pro-
cedural rationality means that the outcome of ab is b).27 The choice of b
from {a, b} changed the type of the individual. In particular, suppose the
ab observable is considered as a coarse measurement of abd. The new type,
expressed in the basis of preference orders on {a, b, d} , is a superposition of
types [b > a > d] , [b > d > a] and [d > b > a] . In order to make her choice
out of {a, b, c, d} , she now plays bcd. The result of that last measurement
(performed on the individual of the type resulting from the first measure-
ment) is therefore b with positive probability. But this violates the principle
of independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA). She effectively selects b from
{a, b, c, d} while she initially picked up c in {a, b, c} where b was available.
Yet, it is easy to check that in this example any two consecutive choices
satisfy the WARP’ so the choice behavior of our type indeterminate agent is
”rational”.
We can now draw some first conclusions from this short exploration. If
we demand that the agent’s choice behavior respects the Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preference (in our WARP’ formulation) and conforms to procedural
rationality, then
i. when all the DS associated with subsets of the universal set commute,
a type indeterminate agent does not distinguish herself from a classical agent;
ii. when some DS associated with subsets of the universal set do not com-
mute with each other, a type indeterminate agent does not have a preference
order over the universal set X. But she may have well-behaved preferences
over subsets ofX. Generally, she does not behave as a classical rational agent.
In particular, her behavior may exhibit standard phenomena of preference
reversal.
27We remind that ”playing a DS” means performing the corresponding measurement
(see section 2.2).
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In this example the distinction between the classical rational and the
type indeterminate rational agent is only due to the non-commutativity of
DS associated with different subsets of items. This distinctive feature of the
TI-model of choice delivers a formulation of bounded rationality in terms
of the impossibility to compare and order all items simultaneously. Non-
commutativity also implies that as the agent makes a choice her type (pref-
erences) changes. A type indeterminate agent does not have a fixed type
(preferences). Instead her preferences are shaped in the process of elicitation
as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (2000).
3.2 Examples
In this section we demonstrate how type indeterminacy can explain two well-
documented examples of so-called behavioral anomalies. With these exam-
ples we want to suggest that one contribution of our approach is to provide a
unified framework which can accommodate a variety of behavioral anomalies.
These anomalies are currently explained by widely different theories.
3.2.1 Cognitive dissonance
The kind of phenomena we have in mind can be illustrated as follows. Nu-
merous studies show that employees in risky industry (like nuclear plants)
often neglect safety regulations. The puzzle is that before moving into the
risky industry those employees were typically able to estimate the risks cor-
rectly. They were reasonably averse to risk and otherwise behaved in an
ordinary rational manner.
Psychologists developed a theory called cognitive dissonance (CD) ac-
cording to which people modify their beliefs or preferences in response to
the discomfort arising from conflicting beliefs or preferences. In the example
above, they identify a dissonance as follows. On the one hand, the employee
holds an image of himself as ”a smart person” and on the other hand he
understands that he deliberately chose to endanger his health (by moving to
the risky job), which is presumably ”not smart”. So in order to cancel the
dissonance, the employee decides that there is no danger and therefore no
need to follow the strict safety regulation.
We propose a formal model that is very much in line with psychologists’
theory of cognitive dissonance. We shall compare two scenarios involving a
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sequence of two non-commuting Decision Situations each with two options.
Let A be a DS about jobs with options a1 and a2 corresponding to taking a
job with a dangerous task (adventurous type) and respectively staying with
the safe routine (habit-prone type). Let B be a DS about the willingness to
use safety equipement with choices b1 (risk-averse type) and b2 (risk-loving
type) corresponding to the choice of using and respectively not using the
safety equipment.
First scenario: The dangerous task is introduced in an existing context.
It is imposed on the workers. They are only given the choice to use or not
to use the safety equipment (B). We write the initial state of the worker in
terms of the eigenvectors of observable A:
|ψ〉 = λ1 |a1〉+ λ2 |a2〉 , λ21 + λ22 = 1.
We develop the eigenvectors of A on the eigenvectors of B:
|a1〉 = µ11 |b1〉+ µ21 |b2〉 ,
|a2〉 = µ21 |b1〉+ µ22 |b2〉 .
We now write the state in the basis of the B operator:
|ψ〉 = [λ1µ11 + λ2µ21] |b1〉+ [λ1µ12 + λ2µ22] |b2〉 .
The probability that a worker chooses to use the safety equipment is
pB (b1) = 〈b1| ψ〉2 = [λ1µ11 + λ2µ21]2 (7)
= λ21µ
2
11 + λ
2
2µ
2
21 + 2λ1λ2µ11µ21.
Second scenario: First A then B. The workers choose between taking
a new job with a dangerous task or staying with the current safe routine.
Those who chose the new job then face the choice between using safety
equipment or not. Those who turn down the new job offer are asked to answer
a questionnaire about their willingness to use the safety equipment for the
case they would be working in the risky industry. The ex-ante probability
for observing b1 is
pBA (b1) = pA (a1) pB (b1| a1) + pA (a2) pB (b1| a2) (8)
= λ21µ
2
11 + λ
2
2µ
2
21.
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The phenomenon of cognitive dissonance can now be formulated as the fol-
lowing inequality
pBA (b1) < pB (b1) ,
which occurs in our model when 2λ1λ2µ11µ21 > 0.
28 We next show that
interference effects may be quantitatively significant.
Numerical example
Assume for simplicity that |ψ〉 = |b1〉 which means that everybody in the
first scenario is willing to use the proposed safety equipment. Let prob (a1 |ψ ) =
0.25, and prob (a2 |ψ ) = .75 so |λ1| =
√
0.25, and |λ2| =
√
0.75. It is possible
to show that in this case we have |µ11| =
√
0.25, and |µ21| =
√
0.75.29 We
now compute pB(b1) using the formula in (7) and recalling that |ψ〉 =
|b1〉 (so pB(b1) = 1) :
1 = 〈b1 |ψ〉2 = λ21µ211 + λ22µ221 + 2λ1λ2µ11µ21 (9)
= 0.0625 + 0.5625 + 2λ1λ2µ11µ21 = 0.625 + 2λ1λ2µ11µ21.
which implies that the interference effect is positive and equal to 1−0.625 =
0.375. We note that it amounts to a third of the probability.
Under the second scenario the probability for using safety equipment is
given by the formula in (8) i.e., it is the same sum as in (9) without the
interference term:
pBA (b1) = 0.625.
So we see that our TI-model ”delivers” cognitive dissonance: pBA (b1) <
pB (b1) .
The key assumption that drives our result is that the choice between
jobs and the choice between using or not using the safety equipment are
measurements of two incompatible type characteristics (represented by two
non-commuting observables). A possible behavioral interpretation is as fol-
lows. The job decision appeals to an abstract perception of risk, while the
decision to use the safety equipment appeals to an emotional perception of
concrete risks. In this interpretation, our assumption is that the two modes
28We note that pBA (b1) includes the probability of a choice of safety measures both in
the group that chose the risky job and in the group that chose the safe job. This guarantees
that we properly distinguish between the CD effect (change in attitude) and the selection
bias.
29This uses the fact that
(
µ11 µ22
µ21 µ22
)
is a rotation matrix.
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of perceptions are incompatible. This is consistent with evidence that shows
a gap between perceptions of one and the same issue when the agent is in a
”cold” (abstract) state of mind compared to when she is in a ”hot” emotional
state of mind (see for instance Loewenstein 2005).
Comments
In their article from 1981 Akerlof and Dickens explain the behavior at-
tributed to cognitive dissonance in terms of a rational choice of beliefs. Highly
sophisticated agents choose their beliefs to fit their preferences.30 They are
fully aware of the way their subjective perception of the world is biased and
yet they keep to the wrong views. This approach does explain observed be-
havior but raises serious questions as to what rationality means. The type
indeterminacy approach is consistent with psychologists’ thesis that cogni-
tive dissonance prompts a change in preferences (or attitude). We view its
contribution as follows. First, the TI-model provides a model that explains
the appearance of cognitive dissonance. Indeed, if coherence is such a basic
need, as proposed by L. Festinger and his followers, why does dissonance arise
in the first place? In the TI-model dissonance arises when resolving indeter-
minacy in the first DS because of the ‘limitations’ on possible psychological
types (see Section 2.3.2). Second, the TI-model features a dynamic process
such that the propensity to use safety measures is actually altered (reduced)
as a consequence of the act of choice. This dynamic effect is reminiscent of
psychologists’ “drive-like property of dissonance” which leads to a change in
attitude.
3.2.2 Framing Effects
When alternative descriptions of one and the same decision problem induce
different decisions from agents we talk about ”framing effects”. Below we
attend a well-known experiment which showed that two alternative formula-
tions of the Prisoner Dilemma (the standard presentation in a 2 by 2 matrix
and a presentation in a decomposed form, see below) induced dramatically
different rates of cooperation.
Kahneman and Tversky (2002, p. xiv) address framing effects using a
two-steps (nonformal) model of the decision-making process. The first step
30Akerlof and Dickens allow workers to freely choose beliefs (about risk) so as to optimize
utility which includes psychological comfort. The workers are highly rational in the sense
that when selecting beliefs, they internalize their effect their own subsequent bounded
rational behavior.
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corresponds to the construction of a representation of the decision situation.
The second step corresponds to the evaluation of the choice alternatives.
The crucial point is that “the true objects of evaluation are neither objects
in the real world nor verbal description of those objects; they are mental
representations.” To capture this feature we suggest modelling the ”process of
constructing a representation” in a way similar to the process of constructing
preferences, i.e., as a measurement performed on the state of the agent.
This is consistent with psychology that treats attitudes, values (preferences),
beliefs, and representations as mental objects of the same kind.
In line with Kahneman and Tversky we describe the process of decision-
making as a sequence of two steps. The first step consists of a measurement of
the agent’s mental representation of the decision situation. The second step
corresponds to a measurement of the agent’s preferences. Its outcome is a
choice. Note that here we depart from standard decision theory. We propose
that agents do not always have a unique representation of a decision situation,
which can be revealed when thinking about it. Instead, uncertainty about
what the decision situation actually is about can be resolved in a variety of
ways some of which may be reciprocally incompatible. The decision situation
itself is, as in standard theory, defined by the monetary payoffs associated
with the choices i.e., in a unique way. The utility associated with the options
generally depends both on the representation and the monetary payoffs.
To illustrate this approach we revisit the experiment reported in Pruitt
(1970) and discussed in Selten (1998). Two groups of agents are invited to
play a Prisoners’ Dilemma. The game is presented to the first group in the
usual matrix form with the options labelled 1G and 2G (instead of C and D,
presumably to avoid associations with the suggestive terms ‘cooperate’ and
‘defect’):
[C] [D]
1G
3
3
4
0
2G
0
4
1
1
The game is presented to the second group in a decomposed form as
follows:
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For me For him
1G 0 3
2G 1 0
The payoffs are computed as the sum of what you take for yourself and
what you get from the other player. So for instance if player 1 plays 1G and
player 2 plays 2G, player 1 receives 0 from his own play and 0 from the other’s
play) which sums to 0. Player 2 receives 1 from his own play and 3 from player
1’s play which sums to 4. So we recover the payoffs (0,4) associated with the
play of Cooperate for player 1 and Defect for player 2. Game theoretically it
should make no difference whether the game is presented in a matrix form or
in a decomposed form. Pruitt’s main experimental result is that one observes
dramatically more cooperation in the game presented in decomposed form.
We now provide a possible TI-model for this situation. Let us consider
a two-dimensional state space and a sequence of two measurements. The
first measurement determines the mental representation of the DS. We call
A the (representation) observable corresponding to the matrix presentation.
It has two non-degenerated eigenvalues denoted |a1〉 and |a2〉 . Similarly, B
is the observable corresponding to the decomposed presentation with two
eigenvalues |b1〉 and |b2〉. If |ψ〉 is the initial state of the agent, we can write
|ψ〉 = α1 |a1〉+α2 |a2〉 or |ψ〉 = β1 |b1〉+β2 |b2〉 . The second measurement i.e.,
the decision observable is unique, we called it G. G has also two eigenvalues
denoted 1G and 2G.
For the sake of concreteness we may think of the four alternative mental
representations as follows31:
|a1〉 : G is perceived as an (artificial) small-stake game;
|a2〉 : G is perceived by analogy as a real life PD-like situation (often
occurring in a repeated setting).
|b1〉 : G is perceived as a test of generosity;
|b2〉 : G is perceived as a test of smartness.
When confronted with a presentation of the DS the agent forms her
mental representation of the DS which prompts a change in her state from
|ψ〉 to some |ai〉 (if the frame is A) or |bj〉 i, j = 1, 2 (if the frame is B).
The new state can be expressed in terms of the eigenvectors of the decision
situation: |ai〉 = γ1i |1G〉+ γ2i |2G〉 or |bj〉 = δ1j |1G〉+ δ2j |2G〉 .
31This is only meant as a suggestive illustration.
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We can now formulate the framing effect as the following difference
pGA (iG) 6= pGB (iG) , i = 1, 2. (10)
Using our result in Section 2.3.2 we get
pGA (1G) = pG (1G)− 2α1γ11α2γ12 and pGB (1G) = pG (1G)− 2β1δ11β2δ12
where pG (1G) is the probability of choosing 1 in an (hypothetical) unframed
situation. So we have a framing effect whenever 2α1γ11α2γ12 6= 2β1δ11β2δ12.
The experimental results discussed in Selten (1998) namely that the de-
composed presentation induces more cooperation require than 2α1γ11α2γ12−
2β1δ11β2δ12 > 0. The inequality says that the interference term for 1G is
larger in the standard matrix presentation A than in the decomposed form
corresponding to the B presentation. In order to better understand the mean-
ing of this difference we shall consider a simple numerical example.
Set α1 =
√
.8, α2 =
√
.2, β1 =
√
0.4, β2 =
√
0.6. The key variables are
the correlations between the ”representation types” i.e., |ai〉 or |bj〉 and the
”game type” 1G, i.e., the numbers γ11, γ12 and δ11, δ12. We propose that
γ11 =
√
.3 which is interpreted as when the agent views the game as a small
stake game she plays 1G with probability .3. Similarly γ12 =
√
.7 which
means that when the agent perceives the game by analogy with real life,
she ”cooperates” with probability .7. In the alternative presentation B, we
propose that δ11 = 1, i.e., when the game is perceived as a test of generosity,
the agent cooperates with probability 1. When the game is perceived as a
test of smartness δ12 = 0 (because the agent views the play of 1G as plain
stupid). Computing these figures, we get
2α1γ11α2γ11 − 2β1δ11β2δ12 = 0.366− 0 > 0
In the A presentation the contribution of both the |a1〉 and the |a2〉 type
is positive and significant. When the agent is indeterminate both types
positively contribute reinforcing each other. In contrast in the B presentation
the contribution from |b2〉 is null so there is no interference between the
types. When the agent determines herself i.e., selects a representation, the
contribution from indeterminacy is lost and that loss is positive with A while
it is null with B. Therefore, the probability for 1G when the game is presented
in the matrix form is larger (here by .36) than in the game presented in the
decomposed form.
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Comments
Selten proposes a ‘bounded rationality’ explanation: players make a su-
perficial analysis and do not perceive the identity of the games presented
under the two forms. Our approach is closer to Kahneman and Tversky who
suggest that prior to the choice, a representation of the decision situation
must be constructed. The TI-model provides a framework for ‘constructing’
a representation such that it delivers framing effects in choice behavior. Of
course framing effects can easily be obtained when assuming that the mental
images are incomplete or biased. In the TI-model we do not need to appeal
to such self-explanatory arguments. In the TI-model framing effects arise
as a consequence of (initial) indeterminacy of the agent’s representation of
the decision situation. Since alternative (non-commuting) presentations are
equally valid and their corresponding representations (eigenvalues) equally
informative, highly rational agent can exhibit framing effects.
4 Discussion
In this section we briefly discuss some formal features of our model. 32
Our approach to decision-making yields that the type of the agents rather
than being exogenously given, emerges as the outcome of the interaction
between the agent and the decision situations. This is modelled by letting
a decision situation be represented by an operator (observable). Decision-
making is modelled as a measurement process. It projects the initial state
of the agent into the subspace of the state (type) space associated with
the eigenvalue corresponding to the choice made. Observables may either
pairwise commute or not. When the observables commute, the corresponding
type space has the properties of the Harsanyi type space. From a formal
point of view this reflects the fact that all (pure) types are then mutually
exclusive.33 When the observables do not commute, the associated pure types
are not all mutually exclusive. Instead, an agent who is in a pure state
after the measurement of an observable will be in a different pure state after
the measurement of another observable that is incompatible with the first
32For a systematic investigation of the mathematical foundations of the HSM in view of
their relevance for social sciences see Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky (2005).
33We say that a type is pure when it is obtained as the result of a complete measurement
i.e., the measurement of a complete set of commuting observables (CSCO).
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one. As a consequence, the type space cannot be associated with a classical
probability space and we obtain an irreducible uncertainty in behavior. The
Type Indeterminacy model provides a framework where we can deal both
with commuting and non-commuting observables. In the TI-model any
type (state ) corresponds to a probability measure on the type space which
allows to make predictions about the agent’s behavior. It is in this sense that
the TI-model generalizes Harsanyi’s approach to uncertainty.
The more controversial feature of the TI-model as a framework for describ-
ing human behavior is related to the modelling of the impact of measurement
on the state i.e., how the type of the agent changes with decision-making.
The rules of change are captured in the geometry of the type space and in
the projection postulate. It is more than justified to question whether this
seemingly very specific process should have any relevance to Social Sciences.
It has been shown that the crucial property that gives all its structure to
the process of change can be stated as a ”minimal perturbation principle”.
The substantial content of that principle is that we require that when a coarse
DS resolves some uncertainty about the type of an agent, the remaining
uncertainty is left unaffected. Recall our example in section 3.1 case 2. When
the agent chooses an item out of a subset A of 3 items, this prompts a
resolution of some uncertainty. The type is projected into the eigenspace
spanned by the two orderings consistent with the choice made. The minimal
perturbation principle says that uncertainty relative to the ordering of the
two remaining items is the same as before. In behavioral terms this can be
expressed as follows. When confronted with the necessity to make a choice,
the agent only ”makes the effort” to select her preferred item while leaving
the order relationship between the other items uncertain as initially.
It may be argued that the minimal perturbation principle is quite de-
manding. Returning again to our example, if the mental processes involved
in the search for the preferred items fully upset the initial state, the principle
is violated. It could also be argued that the mental processes involved in
decision-making determine the whole ranking. That would also violate the
minimal perturbation principle. This short discussion suggests that selecting
a good TI-model requires careful thinking and possibly some trial and error.
We do not expect the Type Indeterminacy model to be a fully realistic
description of the human behavior rather we propose it as an idealized model
of agents characterized by the fact that their type change with decision-
making. In particular some features of the TI-model, like the symmetry of
the correlation matrix in simple examples may seem very constraining from
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a behavioral point of view. Consider two DS with two options e.g., the
Prisoner Dilemma and the Ultimatum game (with option ”share fairly” and
”share egoistically”). Assuming those DS have nondegenerated eigenvalues,
the symmetry of correlation matrix means that the probability to play e.g.
defect after having played say egoist is exactly the same as the probability to
play egoist after having played defect. We do not expect this kind of equality
to hold in general.34 Nevertheless, keeping in mind some reservations as to its
realism, our view is that the Type Indeterminacy model can provide a fruitful
framework for analyzing, explaining and predicting human behavior. Clearly
much additional work is needed to extend of the TI-model to strategic and
repeated decision-making. We are currently exploring this second stage of
our research program.
As a final remark it should be emphasized that not all instances of non-
commutativity in choice behavior call for Hilbert space modelling. Theories
of addiction feature effects of past choices on future preferences. And in
standard consumer theory, choices do have implications for future behavior,
i.e., when goods are substitutes or complements. But in those cases we do
expect future preferences to be affected by the choices. The Type Indetermi-
nacy model of decision-making can be useful when we expect choice behavior
to be consistent with the standard probabilistic model, because nothing jus-
tifies a modification of preferences. Yet, actual behavior contradicts those
expectations.
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5 Appendix: Elements of Quantum Mechan-
ics
5.1 States and Observables
In Quantum Mechanics the state of a system is represented by a vector |ψ〉 in
a Hilbert space H. According to the superposition principle, every complex
linear combination of state vectors is a state vector. A Hermitian operator
called an observable is associated to each physical property of the system.
Theorem 1
A Hermitian operator A has the following properties:
- Its eigenvalues are real.
- Two eigenvectors corresponding to different eigenvalues are orthogonal.
- There is an orthonormal basis of the relevant Hilbert space formed with
the eigenvectors of A.
Let us call |v1〉 , |v2〉 , ..., |vn〉 the normalized eigenvectors of A forming a
basis of H. They are associated with eigenvalues α1,α2, ..., αn, so: A |vi〉 =
αi |vi〉. The eigenvalues can possibly be degenerated, i.e., for some i and j,
αi = αj. This means that there is more than one linearly independent eigen-
vector associated with the same eigenvalue. The number of these eigenvectors
defines the degree of degeneracy of the eigenvalue which in turn defines the
dimension of the eigensubspace spanned by these eigenvectors. In this case,
the orthonormal basis of H is not unique because it is possible to replace the
eigenvectors associated to the same eigenvalue by any complex linear combi-
nation of them to get another orthonormal basis. When an observable A has
no degenerated eigenvalue there is a unique orthonormal basis of H formed
with its eigenvectors. In this case (see below), it is by itself a Complete Set
of Commuting Observables.
Theorem 2
If two observables A and B commute there is an orthonormal basis of H
formed by eigenvectors common to A and B.
Let A be an observable with at least one degenerated eigenvalue and B
another observable commuting with A. There is no unique orthonormal basis
formed by A eigenvectors. But there is an orthonormal basis of the relevant
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Hilbert space formed by eigenvectors common to A and B. By definition,
{A,B} is a Complete Set of Commuting Observables (CSCO) if this basis
is unique. Generally, a set of observables {A,B, ...} is said to be a CSCO if
there is a unique orthonormal basis formed by eigenvectors common to all
the observables of the set.
5.2 Measurements
An observable A is associated to each physical property of a system S. Let
|v1〉 , |v2〉 , ..., |vn〉 be the normalized eigenvectors of A associated respectively
with eigenvalues α1,α2, ..., αn and forming a basis of the relevant state space.
Assume the system is in the normalized state |ψ〉. A measurement of A
on S obeys the following rules, collectively called ‘Wave Packet Reduction
Principle’ (the Reduction Principle).
Reduction Principle
1. When a measurement of the physical property associated with an
observable A is made on a system S in a state |ψ〉, the result only can be
one of the eigenvalues of A.
2. The probability to get the non-degenerated value αi is P (αi) =
|〈vi|ψ〉|2 .
3. If the eigenvalue is degenerated then the probability is the sum over
the eigenvectors associated with this eigenvalue: P (αi) =
∑∣∣〈νji |ψ〉∣∣2 .
4. If the measurement of A on a system S in the state |ψ〉 has given the
result αi then the state of the system immediately after the measurement
is the normalized projection of |ψ〉 onto the eigensubspace of the relevant
Hilbert space associated with αi. If the eigenvalue is not degenerated then
the state of the system after the measurement is the normalized eigenvector
associated with the eigenvalue.
If two observables A and B commute then it is possible to measure both
simultaneously: the measurement of A is not altered by the measurement
of B. This means that measuring B after measuring A does not change the
value obtained for A. If we again measure A after a measurement of B, we
again get the same value for A. Both observables can have a definite value.
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5.2.1 Interferences
The archetypal example of interferences in quantum mechanics is given by
the famous two-slits experiment.35 A parallel beam of photons falls on a
diaphragm with two parallel slits and strikes a photographic plate. A typical
interference pattern showing alternate bright and dark rays can be seen. If
one slit is shut then the previous figure becomes a bright line in front of the
open slit. This is perfectly understandable if we consider photons as waves,
as it the assumption is in classical electromagnetism. The explanation is
based on the fact that when both slits are open, one part of the beam goes
through one slit and the other part through the other slit. Then, when the
two beams join on the plate, they interfere constructively (giving bright rays)
or destructively (giving dark ones), depending on the difference in length of
the paths they have followed. But a difficulty arises if photons are considered
as particles, as can be the case in quantum mechanics. Indeed, it is possible to
decrease the intensity of the beam so as to have only one photon travelling
at a time. In this case, if we observe the slits in order to detect when a
photon passes through (for example, by installing a photodetector in front of
the slits), it is possible to see that each photon goes through only one slit. It
is never the case that a photon splits to go through both slits. The photons
behave like particles. Actually, the same experiment was done with electrons
instead of photons, with the same result. If we do the experiment this way
with electrons (observing which slit the electrons go through, i.e., sending
light through each slit to “see” the electrons), we see that each electron goes
through just one slit and, in this case, we get no interference. If we repeat the
same experiment without observing which slit the electrons pass through then
we recover the interference pattern. Thus, the simple fact that we observe
which slit the electron goes through destroys the interference pattern (two
single slit patterns are observed). The quantum explanation is based on
the assumption that when we don’t observe through which slit the electron
has gone then its state is a superposition of both states “gone through slit 1”
and “gone through slit 2”36, while when we observe it, its state collapses onto
one of these states. In the first case, the position measurement is made on
electrons in the superposed state and gives an interference pattern since both
states are manifested in the measurement. In the second case, the position is
35See, e.g., Feynman (1965) for a very clear presentation.
36This doesn’t mean that the photon actually went through both slits. This state simply
can’t be interpretated from a classical point of view.
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measured on electrons in a definite state and no interference arises. In other
words, when only slit 1 is open we get a spectrum, say S1 (and S2 when only
slit 2 is open). We expect to get a spectrum S12 that sums of the two previous
spectra when both slits are open, but this is not the case: S12 6= S1 + S2.
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